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Abstract: This paper focuses on a one person game called Indian policeman’s dilemma 
(IPD). It represents the internal conflict between emotion and profession of a typical 
Indian police officer. We have ‘split’ the game to be played independently by different 
personality modules of the same player. Each module then appears as an independent 
individual player of the game. None of the players knows the exact payoff values of any 
of the others. Only greater than or less than type of inequalities among the payoff values 
across the players are to be inferred probabilistically. There are two Nash equilibrium 
(NE) points in this game signifying two completely opposing behavior by the policeman 
involved. With the help of the probabilistic inequalities probable propensities of the 
different behaviors have been determined. The model underscores the need for new 
surveys and data generation. A design of one such survey to measure professionalism of 
the police personnel has been outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
 
     One person games have been discussed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern 1953). In a bridge each two player team has been treated as a 
single player and the two players in the same team as two representatives of that single 
player (p. 53). This has been termed ‘splitting’ of a player. More specifically various 
games of ‘patience’ and ‘solitaire’ are considered one person games. Indian policeman’s 
dilemma
1
 (IPD) is a one person game where the police officer, who happens to be the 
only player involved, is spilt between two personality tracts namely, ‘Professionalism’ 
and ‘Emotionality’. It has been assumed that the officer makes various moves either from 
purely professional consideration or purely emotional consideration. This makes the 
Professionalism and Emotionality mutually independent. The game has been designed as 
a two player game played by Professionalism and Emotionality of the same officer. 
     Like Bridge and Poker there is no chance move involved in the IPD. However that 
does not mean that everything is certain in this game. The payoff values of the players 
against the strategies of the opponents are unknown and have to be inferred 
                                                 
1
 Policeman’s dilemma refers to the following situation: A devastating fire is engulfing a few vehicles 
following a road accident. Police and rescuers who have reached the scene realize that not everybody can 
be saved from being burnt alive despite the best efforts. One motorist who was sure to die in the inferno 
begged an armed policeman to shoot him so that he could have a less painful death. Euthanasia is illegal, 
but not killing in such a situation is inhuman. This is called policeman’s dilemma or PD, which can be 
modeled as a one person constant sum game with two mutually conflicting strategies. 
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probabilistically from the events in the environment. In this sense IPD is a game of 
incomplete information. We will show that in order to reach a solution to the game it will 
be enough to know about the dominance relationship between certain pairs of payoff 
values of the two players. 
     This game has another significance. It represents an oriental model. While physical, 
mathematical, chemical, biological, earth and atmospheric sciences are same in the east 
and in the west, the social sciences tend to be different due to the influence of culture 
between orient and occident. IPD represents a professional dilemma of the police 
personnel in many third world countries, particularly India. In more general form it is 
probably true of any professional human being, when the person has to resolve the 
conflict between gains through professional commitments and gains through emotional 
commitments. The utility function here is the maximization of personal gain. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953) have quantified the 
gain (p. 86), but in case of the IPD the quantification of personal gain is impossible or 
extremely difficult to make. Here we haven’t tried to quantify the gains at all, but 
analyzed the game only in terms of gain dominance. 
     In the next section we describe the game of IPD. In section 3 we give a normal form 
representation of it. In section 4 we determine its two Nash equilibrium points. In section 
5 we probabilistically determine several inequalities among the payoff values, because 
the actual payoff values are not known. In section 6 we propose a professionalism index 
for the Indian police personnel. In section 7 we give the complete solution of the game. 
We conclude the paper with a discussion. 
 
 
2. The game 
 
     A wealthy businessman B has violated a law L, which if convicted is punishable by a 
jail term. B is wealthy and influential enough to involve the area police chief P who is 
from the federal civil service cadre (B is influential enough to subdue the local police 
station officers who usually make such arrests). P has two options to book B under L. 
Subsection 1 of L or L(1) that imposes a maximum prison term of six months and after 
being arrested the accused is eligible for bail right from the police station. On the other 
hand L(2) imposes a maximum prison term of two years and it is non-bailable in the 
sense that the bail can be granted by a court only for which the accused may have to wait 
till the next morning. In other words, he will have to spend one night in a crowded police 
lock up with poor amenities. Also under L(2) getting bail will be a little difficult. The 
longer he stays in custody the more the case will get media attention and it will be 
increasingly more difficult for him to avoid a sentence. On the other hand, if he can avoid 
the stigma of being in police custody, taking advantage of his money power and 
prolonged legal processes, chances are high that he will not be convicted at all, and 
therefore will never have to go to jail, which will be particularly easier under L(1). 
     Sensing the arrest is inevitable B tries to fix a deal with P. According to the deal if B 
is booked under L(1) P’s son, who is studying in an expensive private university in the 
west and having a hard time to arrange the course fee for the next session, will receive a 
fat scholarship from a trust headed by B. The amount is enough to clear his tuition for the 
coming session. Of course if B is booked under L(2) P’s son receives nothing. He could 
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not qualify for aids from his current university and must take a study loan at high interest 
to continue. Since both B’s son and P’s son went to the same (elite) school in the town 
and have mutually overlapping friend circles this was pretty well known to B. 
     Only a week ahead of the day of the imminent arrest the ruling party lost the 
provincial election and the opposition came to power (police is under the control of the 
provincial government including the federal civil service cadre officers serving in it). In 
the mean time P’s next promotion is due (it happens in time scale). B is a well known 
fund raiser for the previous ruling party and if he is booked under L(2) P will be offered a 
glamorous post, which will considerably enhance his status and influence. Alternatively, 
if B is booked under L(1) P will get a position, although higher than the present one, is 
widely considered as unattractive. His son’s tuition fee for the next session must be 
cleared within thirty days and the credit situation in his country of residence is positively 
bad. 
 
 
3. The normal form 
 
     From the point of view of ‘rational play’ B’s freedom to choose from among available 
strategies is rather limited. If P chooses L(1) B is almost certain to get bail soon after the 
arrest. It is highly unlikely that he would be arrested again until there is a negative verdict 
by the court and his subsequent bail plea is rejected, chances of which are not too high. 
So, B does not have to do anything other than following the ‘normal procedure’. On the 
other hand if P chooses L(2) B will come forward with the deal in the hope that P will go 
back on his decision and will choose L(1) instead. We find it reasonable to model the 
game as a one person game played by P against his environment in which B simply acts 
as an agent. The other prominent environmental agents are the prevailing political 
situation and the cultural tradition (e.g., high level of family commitment). Following is 
the payoff matrix of the game in its normal form. 
 
 
                                                                  Profession 
                                                         L(1)                     L(2) 
 
 
                      Fatherhood   
     Emotion                                         
                      Promotion 
 
 
 
 
 
     P’s decision is governed by two competing aspects of his behavior namely, his 
professionalism (denoted by Profession in the payoff matrix) and emotionality (denoted 
by Emotion in the payoff matrix). The technical significance of the words profession and 
1111,PFEM  1212 ,PFEM  
2121 ,PFEM  2222 ,PFEM  
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emotion is unimportant. In this paper we will assume profession and emotion are two 
independent entities, not affecting each other. 
     Profession and Emotion (of P) are the two players of the game, with Profession has 
two strategies L(1) and L(2), and the two strategies for Emotion are Fatherhood and (a 
desire of attractive) Promotion. ijEM  and ijPF  are the payoff values of Emotion and 
Profession respectively. The values of ijEM  and ijPF , }2,1{, ∈ji  depend on the 
environment and we will make probabilistic estimation of some of the inequalities 
involving them. This will be enough to estimate different decisions that P can make, 
based on the outcomes of the game. 
     Clearly the over-arching objective function of the game is achieving satisfaction by P 
through professionalism and emotionality. 
 
 
4. Nash equilibrium 
 
     Any game involving a finite number of players, each with a finite number of pure 
strategies must have an NE (Nash 1950). Since IPD is a two person game, each with only 
two pure strategies, it is feasible to find the NE by brute force. From the payoff matrix it 
is clear that when column player employs L(1) then 11EM  is the highest payoff for the 
row player and therefore it is underlined (Equation (1) below). When column player 
employs L(2), 22EM  is the highest payoff for the row player and therefore it is 
underlined (Equation (3)). Similarly, when row player chooses the strategy Fatherhood 
the highest payoff for the column player to be underlined is 11PF  (Equation (4)). When 
row player chooses Promotion the highest payoff for the column player is 22PF  
(Equation (6)). Since 11EM , 11PF  and 22EM , 22PF  pairs have been underlined both the 
)1,1(  and )2,2(  cells of the payoff matrix are NE points (Gibbons 1992, p. 9). Now which 
one will guide the decision of P? Plenty of uncertainties are involved, because we do not 
know the values of the payoffs. We must resort to probabilistic arguments. 
 
 
5. Probabilistic inferences 
 
     In this paper our goal will never be to infer exact values of the entries of the payoff 
matrix, but to infer with high probability if some greater than or less than type of 
relationships hold among the values. We will be interested in questions like “What is the 
probability of 2111 EMEM >  or )( 2111 EMEMp > ?” 
     The probability inequalities (1) to (6) below follow from the payoff matrix. (1) holds 
because the urge of fatherhood requires P to book B under L(1), but the urge for a better 
promotion in P discourages him to book B under L(1). So 11EM  is a bigger payoff than 
21EM . 
 
                                       ( ) 12111 => EMEMp .                                                                (1) 
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     (2) holds because the commitment of P’s fatherhood is more conducive for applying 
L(1) than L(2) for him on B. 
 
                                       ( ) 11211 => EMEMp .                                                                (2) 
 
     (3) holds because if L(2) is applied then payoff to desire of promotion will be higher 
than the commitment of fatherhood on the part of P. 
 
                                       ( ) 11222 => EMEMp .                                                                (3) 
 
     (4) holds because professionalism of P puts higher value on 11PF  than 21PF  when 
L(1) is to be applied. Note that here unlike in equation (1) there is no question about 
booking B under L(1). The only issue is to compare between the payoffs when L(1) has 
been invoked as an inevitable strategy. 
 
                                       ( ) 12111 => PFPFp .                                                                   (4) 
 
     (5) holds because desire of promotion of P will have higher payoff value when L(2) is 
applied on B rather than L(1). 
 
                                       ( ) 12122 => EMEMp .                                                                (5) 
 
     (6) holds because professionalism of P puts higher value on 22PF  than 12PF  when 
L(2) is to be applied. 
                                       ( ) 11222 => PFPFp .                                                                   (6) 
 
From section 4 we know that 1111,PFEM  and 2222 ,PFEM  are NE representing two 
different behaviors by P. 1111,PFEM  is for booking B under L(1) and accepting the 
scholarship for P’s son. 2222 ,PFEM  is for booking B under L(2) and accept the desired 
promotion. In each of the next two sections (4 and 5) we will establish one probabilistic 
inequality. These inequalities will determine the probability of the NE to be chosen by P. 
In section 7 we will find the complete solution of the game. 
     Unlike Harsanyi (Harsanyi 1967) here we will be dealing with objective probability, 
because subjective probability makes sense only with respect to P, but not with respect to 
the players Profession and Emotion in our game. P’s judgment (manifested through 
Profession and Emotion) will be based on his learning from his environment (both social 
and natural) in the course of his life. The comparison 2211 EMEM >  in his mind will be 
an objective Bayesian probability conditional to B’s offer and government’s offers. 
     Let Ω  be the space of all events occurring in P’s environment, which incorporates the 
events =1e  B will offer a scholarship to P’s son, =2e  The state government will offer P 
the promotion 1 (desired by P), =3e  The state government will offer P the promotion 2 
(not so much desired by P). It is clear jijiee ji ≠∈=∩ },3,2,1{,,ϕ , and since all these 
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three events make up the event space }3,2,1{, ∈∪=Ω ieii . Probability measures of the 
events, under the assumption of independent identical distribution (i.i.d), are as following 
 
                                             
3
1
)()()( 321 === epepep .                                                  (7) 
 
We are interested in the probability of the events }{ 221112 EMEMem >=  and 
}{ 112221 PFPFpf >=  i.e., )( 12emp  and )( 21pfp  respectively. In this section we will 
derive )( 12emp  and we will take up )( 21pfp  in the next. 
 
Theorem 1: Under the assumption of equation (7) if )()|( 2122 epemep =  and 
)()|( 3123 epemep =  then )()|( 12112 empeemp = . In other words, if the government’s (or 
of the political party in power) decision of promotion for P is not influenced by the 
concern for his emotional tendencies then P’s bribe payoff considerations remain 
unaffected by an offer of bribe (a more realistic interpretation appears after the proof). 
 
Proof: Let us assume )()|( 2122 epemep =  and )()|( 3123 epemep =  both hold good. 
     By Bayes’ rule we can write 
 
                                                   
∑
=
=
3
1
12
1121
121
)|()(
)|()(
)|(
k
kk eempep
eempep
emep .                             (8) 
 
Let 
 
                                                  α=)|( 121 emep ,                                                             (9) 
 
where 10 ≤≤α . By Bayes’ rule we have 
 
                                        
)(
)|()(
)|(
2
12212
212
ep
emepemp
eemp = ,                                      (10) 
 
in which )()|( 2122 epemep = . So by (10) it implies )()|( 12212 empeemp = . Similarly 
from )()|( 3123 epemep =  we get )()|( 12312 empeemp = . 
     From (7), (8), (9), (10) we get 
 
                                       )(
1
2
)|( 12112 empeemp α
α
−
= .                                                   (11) 
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Or, 
α
α
α
α
−
=⇒
−
=
∩
13
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)|()(
1
2
)(
)(
12112
1
112 emepemp
ep
eemp
. Since 0≠α , by (9) we 
derive 
 
                                       
3
1
=α .                                                                                      (12) 
 
Substituting (12) in (9) we have 
 
                                       )(
3
1
)|( 1121 epemep == ,                                                          (13) 
 
which implies )()|( 1112 epeemp = .                                                                                    
 
     In some countries attractive promotions are often offered as a reward for loyalty rather 
than professional excellence. If this stops commitment towards professionalism will 
increase and therefore tendency to accept bribe will decrease. If the assertion of Theorem 
1 is viewed this way it will look more convincing than it appears initially. Theorem 1 also 
supports Harsanyi’s observation, “One of the great intellectual achievements of the 
twentieth century is the Bayesian theory of rational behavior under risk and uncertainty.” 
(Harsanyi, 1978). 
     Since independence of 12em  and 1e  is not a practical proposition we have to admit 
that 12em  is dependent on { }3,2,1, ∈iei . By (7) it is easy to establish 
 
                                   )())|()|()|((3 12312212112
1 empeempeempeemp =++− .          (14) 
 
     The cumulative amount of deviation from the ethical and the legal standards that 
might be termed as corruption is )|()|()|( 312212112 eempeempeemp ++  (from section 
4 it is clear that )( 12emp  and )( 21pfp  are the quantities which will determine P’s 
decision, out of which )( 12emp  signifies the propensity to accept B’s offer and therefore 
signifies corruption in P’s mentality) to which we assign values according to the 
following formula 
 
                 







−=++ ∫
∞ −
C
x
dxereempeempeemp 10.2312212112
2
10.2
1
1)|()|()|(
π
,        (15) 
 
where )( 22EMpr =  ( 10 << r ) is the probability of choosing 22EM , C  is the latest 
available Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by the Transparency International 
(TI) ( 101 << C , 180  countries listed so far with the lowest score 1.1 , the higher is C  the 
less corrupt the nation is). 10  signifies the 10  point scoring scale of CPI. In 2009 India 
had 4.3=C  (CPI 2009). By (14) and (15) we get 
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                                       







−= ∫
∞ −
C
x
dxe
r
emp 10.212
2
10.2
1
1
3
)(
π
.                                     (16) 
 
For India remp 3090.0)( 12 = . It is clear that r  is an important quantity, in other words, 
the payoff value assigned to 22EM  is important. 22EM  is of course person specific and 
culture specific. If 22EM  is taken to be larger than the usual value (the so called mean 
value of an average population) then r  will be small and so )( 12emp . Let us state our 
second important result in the form of 
 
Theorem 2: There is less than %31  chance that P will be motivated to accept B’s offer. 
 
Proof: 31.03090.0)( 12 <= remp , because 10 << r .                                                        
 
     Now we will be estimating ( )21pfp . It is not clear from the description of the game 
whether B’s offence is serious enough to warranty L(2). If there is strong circumstantial 
evidence to book him under L(2) then obviously ( ) 11112 => PFPFp . If on the other hand 
B’s prima-facie offence is not strong enough to sustain L(2) against him then 
( )
2
1
1211 >> PFPFp . So we have the following two cases. 
 
Case 1: ( ) 11112 => PFPFp  
 
     From (6) we have ( ) 11222 => PFPFp . ( ) ( ))()( 1112122221 PFPFPFPFppfp >∩>= . 
( ) )()()()( 1112122211121222 PFPFpPFPFpPFPFPFPFp >×>=>∩> , because 
1222 PFPF >  and 1112 PFPF >  are mutually independent. So 
 
                                       ( ) 121 =pfp .                                                                              (17) 
 
Case 2: ( )
2
1
1211 >> PFPFp  
 
     The question is “What is the probability ( )21pfp ?” Notice that here we do not have 
CPI type of data provided by the TI. To the best of knowledge of the author no survey of 
professionalism of the Indian police personnel ever existed. Therefore a professionalism 
survey for the policemen has been outlined in the next section. 
 
 
6. Professionalism index 
 
     Professionalism has been quantified by professional-index or p-index by Hoy 
(McMahon & Hoy 2009, Hoy 2009). This p-index was originally designed to measure 
professionalism (in terms of a score) of the American school teachers. Many of the 8 
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attributes on which professionalism has been measured will be applicable for measuring 
professionalism of the police personnel also. Here we have adopted the original p-index 
of Hoy in a modified manner to test the professionalism of the Indian police officers. The 
7 statements (to be confirmed or denied by the respondent by one of six different choices) 
that make up the survey questionnaire are as following: (1) I am serious about intervening 
whenever there is a breach of law in my sight even during the off duty hours although it 
does not bring me any additional incentive from my department. (2) My colleagues do 
not give me a lot of credit for being an effective policeperson. (3) I welcome critical 
opinion on my performance. (4) I do not keep myself updated about the latest 
interpretations of the Indian Penal Code, (Indian) Criminal Procedure Code, Indian 
Evidence Act and Indian Police Act, because this is the public prosecutor’s job. (5) 
Professional development is usually a waste of time. (6) I find departmental meetings 
reviewing the law and order situations from time to time useless, because they do not 
give me more power to deal with the violation of laws. (7) Police personnel have a 
responsibility to participate in the public relations exercises. The six choices of answer 
are (a) strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) somewhat disagree, (d) somewhat agree, (e) 
agree, (f) strongly agree. The scoring protocol of Hoy (Hoy 2009) and McMahon & Hoy 
(McMahon & Hoy 2009) has been followed. This score has been normalized to a 10 point 
scale to produce the p-index for our current survey. Normalization keeps the scale of CPI 
and p-index the same. The higher is the score the more is the professionalism. 
     Till the time of submitting this manuscript we could not gather response of a single 
police officer to the survey. For multiple responses the average p-index is to be taken as 
the p-index of the sample. If the sample is representative and large enough, national p-
index for the police can be statistically inferred. If it can be done for each country in the 
world then the countries can be ranked according to the professionalism of their police 
department. It may be worth observing that the notion of modern professionalism is very 
much based on capitalistic value systems. The higher the capitalism in a society the more 
deep rooted will be the capitalistic value system, and stronger will be the sense of 
professionalism among the individuals of that society. In such a society police will 
invariably be more professional than in a relatively feudal society. Capitalistically India 
is backward than the West European, North American and some East Asian countries. 
We quite arbitrarily assign the international rank 30 to India according to the national 
police p-index, which we take as 5.6  (the higher the rank and the p-index the more 
professional the police of that country is). 
 
 
7. Complete solution 
 
     In view of inequalities (1) to (6) it is clear that the NE and therefore the solution of the 
IPD game, which will decide the course of decision of P, completely hinges on precisely 
two events namely, 12em  and 21pf . So )( 12emp  and )( 21pfp  will guide the decision of 
P. We have an upper bound on )( 12emp  due to Theorem 2. In view of the p-index survey 
we have a CPI type index available to us for measuring professionalism of the police 
personnel. So we are in a position to adopt a similar formulation for )( 21pfp  also. 
Accordingly, following (15) we write 
 
 10 
                 







−=++ ∫
∞ −
Q
x
dxesepfpepfpepfp 10.2321221121
2
10.2
1
1)|()|()|(
π
,          (18) 
 
where )( 11PFps =  ( 10 << s ), Q  is the p-index for the Indian policepersons (taken to be 
5.6 ) and 10  for the 10  point scoring scale adopted for the p-index. Following (16) we 
get 
 
                                       







−= ∫
∞ −
Q
x
dxe
s
pfp 10.221
2
10.2
1
1
3
)(
π
.                                     (19) 
 
According to the above data India spfp 2999.0)( 21 =  (unlike )( 12emp , )( 21pfp  has 
been calculated on fictitious data, however exactly the same calculation will carry over to 
real data when they will be available). 
 
Theorem 3: When B’s prima-facie offence is not strong enough to sustain L(2) against 
him then, there will be less than %30  chance that B will be booked under L(2). 
 
Proof: 30.02999.0)( 21 <= spfp , because 10 << s .                                                        
 
     By Theorem 2 we have 31.0)( 12 <emp . So 69.0)( 1122 >> EMEMp  and by Case 1 
of section 5, 1)( 21 =pfp  (equation (17)). Hence the probability that P will be guided by 
the NE point in cell )2,2(  of the payoff matrix is 69.01.69.0 => . That is, if there is 
strong circumstantial evidence to book B under L(2), there will be greater than %69  
chance that he will be booked under L(2). From Theorem 2 it is clear that lower the value 
of r  the higher the chance is for P to book B under L(2) in the situation of Case 1 in 
section 5. Let us recall that )( 22EMpr = . r  is the probability density function of the 
values that can be assigned to 22EM . If 22EM  is kept high, much above average, then 
obviously r  will be small and the probability that P will choose the cell )2,2(  as the 
point to behave in accordance with will be 69.0>> . In other words if P is over jealous 
for promotion then B has little chance to escape L(2) under the situation of Case 1, which 
is quite reasonable. 
     In the situation of Case 2 in section 5, in place of equation (17) Theorem 3 will govern 
the value of )( 21pfp . So 2999.0)( 21 ≤pfp . By Theorem 2, 691.0)(1 12 ≥− emp . The 
probability that P’s action will be guided by the NE point, cell )2,2( , in the payoff matrix 
is ( ))(1)( 1221 emppfp − . A lot will depend on r  and s , but ( ))(1)( 1221 emppfp −  cannot 
be greater than 2999.0 . So even if P is over jealous for promotion ( 0→r ) and his 
professionalism is very much average ( 1→s ) the chances of B’s booked under L(2) is 
not more than 2999.0 . 
     The probability that P’s action will be guided by the NE point, cell )1,1( , in the payoff 
matrix is ( ))(1)( 2112 pfpemp − . By Theorem 2 3090.0)( 12 ≤emp  and by Theorem 3 
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7001.0)(1 21 ≥− pfp . That is, the probability of P’s accepting B’s offer is never more 
than 3090.0 . 
     We can summarize – if there is a strong prima facie evidence to book B under L(2) 
then there is more than %69  chance that he will be booked under L(2). His effort to bribe 
P has less than %31  chance to succeed. When prima facie evidence against B to book 
him under L(2) is not strong enough he has %99.29  or less chance of being booked 
under L(2). In this particular situation the bribing effort is likely to be more successful. In 
other words if P is too politically motivated to appease the ruling party a suitable bribe 
can upset his effort. Corruption progenies corruption. This again supports the assertion of 
Theorem 1. 
 
 
Discussions 
 
     In this paper we have presented a game theoretic model of how a police officer is 
resolving the conflict between his professional commitment and personal commitment. 
This is a one person game, that has been split into a two person game of inner-conflicts of 
the same person. This clearly shows a way to how a one person game can be formulated 
as an n-person game, which was originally been suggested by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953). 
     Unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, the IPD does not have clearly determined payoff 
values for all the strategies. In case of the IPD determining the exact payoff values is 
difficult (sometimes may even be impossible). Here we have seen that some greater than 
or less than type of relationships can be inferred probabilistically and that is good enough 
to predict the behavior of the player of the one person game. 
     IPD has been formulated in the backdrop of the Indian society, where the cultures are 
different from the west. Equation (7) is a simplistic but very important assumption. In a 
more realistic situation the event space will be larger with unequal probabilities for the 
individual members. Particularly for unequal probability measure for different events (the 
event space makes up the environment of the player) almost all the subsequent 
calculations will become very complicated. One way to tackle this might be Bayesian 
inferences based on suitable priors. We have already exhibited the power of Bayesian 
inference in Theorem 1. But it is based on the over simplistic assumption of equation (7). 
     Equations (15) and (18) need to be built up based on proper surveys. Only a survey of 
appropriate magnitude can indicate which probability distribution should be taken. In 
absence of any such survey we have chosen the normal distribution. This however has 
some significant shortcomings. Under (7) and (15) an average officer from a country with 
high CPI score (which means less corrupt) is only marginally less inclined to personal 
gratification than an average officer from a country with low CPI score (means more 
corrupt). Similarly under (7) and (18) an officer with high p-index in the situation of IPD 
will only have marginally more professional commitment than an officer with low p-
index. This underscores the need to reformulate (7), (15) and (18) with adequate practical 
data, which is lacking at present. 
      In this paper in order to get appropriate data for solving the IPD a professionalism 
survey for the policemen has been proposed. The survey has been designed on the line of 
a professionalism index proposed for the school teachers in the USA (Hoy 2009). This 
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has been suitably modified to propose a professionalism index for the Indian police 
personnel. However the survey is yet to be conducted on a sufficient number of police 
personnel. 
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